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Introduction
The notion that intellectual property rights, historically grounded
in territorial law,1 might, in our lifetimes, become converted into uni-
versal norms2 binding on some 125 states seemed like a pipe dream in
the 1980s. Yet, the Final Act of the recently concluded Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, known as the Uruguay Round,3 has transformed
this dream into reality. These negotiations have integrated the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 4 into the much broader
and stronger legal framework of the Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).5 Annex 1C of
this document,6 known as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
1. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities
and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 796-811 (1989) [herein-
after GATT Connection] ("Obsolete Distinction Between Tangible and Intangible Alien
Property").
2. Cf. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-
50 (1993) (stressing the "central role" of multilateral forums "in the creation and shaping
of contemporary international law" and the ability of these forums to "move the solutions
substantially towards acquiring the status of international law").
3. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, done at Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994 [hereinafter Final Act], re-
printed in FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15,
1994, MARRAKESH, MOROCCO 1-428 (Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Executive Office of the President, Washington D.C. 1994) [hereinafter FINAL TEXTS OF
URUGUAY ROUND]. See also Marrakesh [Ministerial] Declaration of 15 April 1994 [here-
inafter Marrakesh Declaration], in FINAL TEXTS OF URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at Ministe-
rial Decisions and Declarations iii-vi.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in 4 GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
[hereinafter GATT, BISD] (1969).
5. See Final Act, supra note 3, [Marrakesh] Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (plus Annexes), in FINAL TEXTS OF URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 9-428
[hereinafter "WTO Agreement"]; see further WTO Agreement, supra, Annex IA, Multilat-
eral Agreements on Trade in Goods, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 3, at 20, 21-38 ("General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994"), 39-324 (Side
Agreements to GATT 1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; WTO Agreement, supra, Appen-
dix-The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), in FINAL TEXTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 485-558 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
6. The word "treaty" is not used in any of the relevant documents and the official
view apparently regards United States acceptance as an Executive Agreement, not subject
to approval by a two-third's vote of the Senate. See, e.g., The Uruguay Round Agreements
Act-Statement of Administrative Action, in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 656, 667-70 (1994) (noting
need for "Congressional approval" of the Uruguay Round agreements and for authoriza-
tion of President to accept them, and stressing that "no provision of a Uruguay Round
agreement will be given effect under domestic law if it is inconsistent with federal law" as
enacted or amended by Congress). Congress has accordingly implemented its view of the
mandatory obligations flowing from the WTO Agreement. See Uruguay Round Agree-
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of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),7 establishes a
comprehensive set of international minimum standards of intellectual
property protection that all WTO member states must respect in their
domestic laws.8 The TRIPS Agreement also requires all member
states to maintain adequate levels of judicial and administrative en-
forcement,9 and it provides dispute-resolution machinery that can lead
to cross-sectoral trade sanctions. 10
In evaluating developments of such capital importance, I contend
that both the strengths and weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement stem
from its essentially backwards-looking character. A source of strength
is that TRIPS builds firmly on the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (1883) and on the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886). 11 In this respect, it
embodies mostly time-tested legal norms that gained acceptance in
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 101, 102, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter URAA]
(approving the relevant trade agreements and the Statement of Administrative Action pro-
posed to implement them). See also David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 1385, 1408-19 (1995).
7. WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, in FINAL TEXTS OF URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at
319-52 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
8. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 9-40; J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995) [hereinafter Universal Minimum Standards]. See also
J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Pros-
pects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 181-253 (1993) (examining draft version of TRIPS Agree-
ment) [hereinafter TRIPS Component]. For changes in United States intellectual property
law that are attributed to (but not always truly required by) the TRIPS Agreement, see
URAA, supra note 6, Title V, Intellectual Property, §§ 501-534.
9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 41-62; see also Al J. Daniel, Jr., Intellectual
Property in the Uruguay Round: The Dunkel Draft and a Comparison of United States
Intellectual Property Rights, Remedies, and Border Measures, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
751, 790-810 (1993).
10. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 63-66; WTO Agreement, supra note 5, An-
nex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in
FINAL TEXTS OF URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 353-78 [hereinafter Understanding on
Disputes]. See also Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 347, 385-88; Robert E.
Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND-A RESULTS-ORI-
ENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180-204 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed.,
1990). For changes in United States trade law occasioned by these provisions (which may
or may not conform to their requirements), see URAA, supra note 6, §§ 121-130.
11. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as
last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Conven-
tion]. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 2(1) (mandating compliance with
Paris Convention (1967), supra, arts. 1-12, 19), and art. 9(1) (mandating compliance with
Berne Convention (1971), supra, arts. 1-21 plus appendix, but not art. 6bis on moral rights).
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developed legal systems. Its principal weakness, however, stems from
the drafters' technical inability and political reluctance to address the
problems facing innovators and investors at work on important new
technologies in an Age of Information. 2 The drafters' decision to
stuff these new technologies into the overworked and increasingly ob-
solete patent and copyright paradigms simply ignores the systemic
contradictions and economic disutilities this same approach was al-
ready generating in the domestic intellectual property systems.13
The treatment of computer software under the TRIPS Agree-
ment exemplifies these strengths and weaknesses. To demonstrate the
deeper implications of its flawed solution, this Article will draw on
core findings of several recently published monographs in which my
co-authors and I identify the real problems troubling the legal protec-
tion of new technologies that fit imperfectly within the classical patent
and copyright molds. 4 This Article, like those monographs, ends by
affirming the need for a new intellectual property paradigm, built on
modified liability principles, that would stimulate investment in sub-
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN SAXBY, THE AGE OF INFORMATION 1-40, 85-145 (1990); Pamela
Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, 16 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323, 324 (1990) (identifying six characteristics of digital media
that make it difficult for existing intellectual property regimes to accommodate produc-
tions in digital form); J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of
World Intellectual Property Law, 24 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [I.I.C.] 446,
448-51, 455-61 (1993) [hereinafter Electronic Information Tools]. See also LUIGI OR-
SENIGO, THE EMERGENCE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN INDUS-
TRIAL INNOVATION 1-29 (1989); JOSEPH STRAUS & RAINER MOUFANG, DEPOSIT AND
RELEASE OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF PATENT PROCEDURE 95-115
(Anthony Rich trans. 1990) ("The Dual Nature of the Results of Biotechnological R & D
and Its Legal Consequences").
13. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Para-
digms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432,2448-504 (1994) [hereinafter Legal Hybrids]; Pamela Sam-
uelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2332-65 (1994) [herein-
after Samuelson et al., Manifesto]. Pamela Samuelson is a Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh; Randall Davis is a Professor of Computer Science and Associate
Director of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology; Mitchell D. Kapor, who founded Lotus Development Corp. and designed Lotus 1-
2-3, is Chairman of the Board of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
14. See supra note 13. See also J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-
Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property Sys-
tem, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995) [hereinafter Collapse of the Patent-Copy-
right Dichotomy]; J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation:
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade After the GATT's
Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75 (1993) [hereinafter Competition Law, Intellec-
tual Property, and Trade].
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patentable innovation without creating the anti-competitive effects
characteristic of existing regimes.' 5
I
Impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the status of computer program-
related patents in international intellectual property law was unde-
fined, while the international status of software copyrights had be-
come controversial. 16 The following discussion suggests that the
TRIPS Agreement ignores software patents as such, which means that
program-related inventions are left largely to the discretion of domes-
tic laws. At the same time, states that do issue such patents will have
to satisfy the international minimum standards set out in the TRIPS
Agreement, and they may not discriminate against the nationals of
other WTO states that do not issue similar patents for valid technical
reasons. In contrast, the TRIPS Agreement brought unpatentable
computer programs squarely within the international copyright system
founded on the Berne Convention. However, it failed to clarify the
scope-of-protection issues that have so far limited the effectiveness of
copyright protection for computer software in the domestic laws.
A. Computer Program-Related Inventions
Historically, the developed countries, especially the United
States, were reluctant to patent computer program-related inventions
at all.17 The European Patent Convention is still couched in terms
15. See infra text accompanying notes 128-160. See generally Legal Hybrids, supra
note 13, at 2436-42, 2504-58.
16. See, e.g., BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J. HART, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COM-
PUTER PROGRAMS IN EUROPE-A GUIDE TO THE E.C. DIRECTIVE 95-97 (Butterworths
1991) [hereinafter CZARNOTA & HART] (recognizing availability of patent protection "not
for computer programs as such, but for inventions of technical effect embodied in com-
puter programs," as per the relevant dispositions of the domestic patent offices and the
European Patent Office); W.R. Cornish, Computer Program Copyright and the Berne Con-
vention, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW 183, 183-86 (M. Lehmann & C.F.
Tapper eds., 1993); infra note 18 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978). See also Ronald S. Laurie, Patentability of Computer Programs in the USA, in THE
LAW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992-A COMPARISON WITH THE USA
87, 88-92 (A.P. Meijboom & C. Prins eds., 1991) [hereinafter LAW OF INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY]; Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032-91
(1990); Henri W. Hanneman, Patentability of Computer Programs in Europe, in LAW OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra, at 78-85 (contrasting restrictive practice of Germany
and U.K. with more liberal practice of the Netherlands).
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that tend to discourage the issuance of such patents. 18 In practice,
however, the patent offices of the United States, Japan, and even the
European Union countries have increasingly granted patents covering
industrial applications of computer programs that produce specified
technical effects while claiming that algorithms as such remain ineligi-
ble. 19 This practice seems likely to grow, in part because of inherent
limits on copyright protection such as those that the United States
federal appellate courts have recently discovered, 20 and in part be-
cause, in a more mature software industry, producers may need higher
levels of technical achievement than in the past to penetrate crowded
market segments.2'
To the extent that some states allowed the patenting of program-
related inventions in the past, the Paris Convention required member
countries to observe its characteristic rules of national treatment and
priority.22 Equally characteristic of the Paris Convention, however,
was its silence regarding such fundamental issues as mandatory sub-
jects of patentability, criteria of eligibility, scope of protection, and
duration. The lack of international minimum standards pertaining to
such basic issues of international patent protection explains why the
developed countries needed a more comprehensive agreement in the
first place.23
18. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature Oct. 5,
1973, 13 I.L.M. 270, art. 52(1),(2),(3) [hereinafter EPC].
19. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543-
45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,
958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also Samuelson, supra note 17, at 1092-132; Gert D.
Kolle, Patentability of Software-Related Inventions in Europe, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 660, 662, 670-75 (1991) (finding favorable trend for patenting software-
related inventions in Europe); Jack M. Hagnes, Computer Software: Intellectual Property
Protection in the United States and Japan, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 245,
261-62 (1995) (stating that patent "protection granted for computer programs in Japan is
similar to the U.S. approach, and many of the ... programs ... patentable under Diehr
would be patentable in Japan").
20. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BAL-
ANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECH-
NOLOGICAL CHANGE 136 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT 1992]; James W. Morando &
Christian H. Hadan, Do Software Patents 'Stac' the Deck Against the Competition?, COM-
PUTER LAW., Apr. 1994, 1-5. See also Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2371-78
("The Nature of the Software Market and Its Consequences").
22. Paris Convention, supra note 11, arts. 2(1), 4A(1). The TRIPS Agreement man-
dates compliance with both rules, whether or not a WTO member country belongs to the
Paris Union. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
23. See, e.g., GATT Connection, supra note 1, at 757-61; see also Keith E. Maskus &
Denise Eby Konan, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: Issues and Exploratory Re-
sults, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 401,
402-26 (Alan V. Deardoff & Robert M. Stern eds. 1994) [hereinafter ISSUES IN THE
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The TRIPS Agreement fills these gaps by obliging WTO member
states to make "[p]atents ... available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step [i.e., nonobviousness], and are ca-
pable of industrial application." 4 Moreover, the same article requires
patents to be "[a]vailable and patent rights enjoyable without discrim-
ination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced."25 While a short
list of exemptions allows states to exclude from patentability such cat-
egories as medical treatments, plants and certain other life forms, and
inventions dangerous to health or the environment, 26 it makes no
mention of computer programs.
It follows that no WTO member state could deny patent protec-
tion to all computer program-related inventions as such without al-
lowing inventors the possibility of showing that some particular
program-related inventions, as determined by reasonably applied cri-
teria recognized by mature legal systems, met the overall minimum
standards of eligibility specified above. 7 This makes sense because,
disregarding considerations of practicality, electrical engineers could,
in principle, express most software designs in cumbersome but func-
tionally equivalent hardware designs.2 8 To deny these designs access
to international patent protection as a class would violate the express
prohibition -against field specific exclusions from eligibility.
At this point, however, the failure of the TRIPS Agreement to
mention software patents, or otherwise to deal with the difficulties this
subject matter has engendered, becomes a two-edged sword because it
provides no statutory basis for overcoming the formidable doctrinal
obstacles to patentability that prevail in most developed legal sys-
tems.2 9 On the contrary, a WTO dispute-settlement panel3" charged
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM] (critically evaluating arguments for and against stronger inter-
national patent protection in economic terms).
24. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27(1) & n.5 (emphasis supplied).
25. Id. (emphasis supplied). This clause recognizes the possibility for developing
countries to delay implementation under art. 65(4) and their need to respect the pipeline
provisions of art. 70(8). See also Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 351-66.
26. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 27(2), (3).
27. See, e.g., id. arts. 62(1) (granting of rights to be conditioned on "reasonable proce-
dures and formalities"), 63(1) (requiring transparency with regard to laws and regulations,
final judicial decisions, and administrative rulings), 64(1) (discussing dispute settlement
procedures), 68 (Council for TRIPS to monitor members' compliance with their
obligations).
28. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2319 (citing authorities).
29. See supra note 17; infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
30. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 63-66. See also supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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with investigating complaints that certain states did not adequately
recognize program-related patents would logically have to take these
restrictive state practices into account. 31 Such a panel would, accord-
ingly, have to consider judicial exclusions pertaining to laws of nature
and naturally occurring phenomena; to scientific principles or mathe-
matical formulas; to abstract ideas, such as methods for doing busi-
ness; to mental processes as such; and, in the European Union, to
"presentations of information. '32 It would further have to evaluate
the complex doctrinal tools that courts in different countries use to
distinguish claims that recite statutory subject matter from those that
merely contain algorithms or other unprotectable subject matter.33 Fi-
31. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the International Court of Justice, (I.C.J.) art. 38(b);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 903 (1987).
32. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1542-43 (Fed. Cir. 1994); EPC, supra note 18, art. 52(2)(d); Hanneman, supra note 17, at
70-79. See also USPTO, Guidelines for Examination of Computer-Implemented Inventions,
60 FED. REG. 28, 77 (1995) (proposed June 2, 1995) [hereinafter USPTO Proposed
Guidelines].
33. See, e.g., Laurie, supra note 17, at 96-101. In the past, for example, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office issued patents for computer program-related inven-
tions that were described either as a series of functional steps carried out by a computer
(i.e., as a process) or as a system capable of performing certain functions (i.e., as an appara-
tus), but not for program code as such. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that claims to a specified
process or apparatus implemented in accordance with a mathematical algorithm will gener-
ally satisfy the patent statute). In either case, United States courts formally treated the
subject matter as statutory only if a claimed invention consists of a so-called "non-statutory
mathematical algorithm" as defined in complicated legal tests that aim to exclude scientific
principles, abstract ideas, and mathematical formulas or discoveries. See, e.g., In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In the pres-
ence of a mathematical algorithm, courts used these tests to determine if it had been suffi-
ciently applied to a utilitarian objective, as when a computer was used as part of a process
or apparatus for the transformation of a physical substance into a different state. See, e.g.,
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543-45 (stating that the "fact that the four claimed means ele-
ments function to transform one set of data to another through what may be viewed as a
series of mathematical calculations" did not preclude claim as a whole from reciting patent-
able machine, on theory that "general purpose computer in effect becomes a special pur-
pose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to
instructions from program software"). Recent cases and proposed guidelines have applied
these principles in a more relaxed and inclusive manner that lowers the subject-matter
barrier. See infra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Richard H. Stern, Tales from the
Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371
(1991); David S. Benyacar, Mathematical Algorithm Patentability: Understanding the Con-
fusion, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 129 (1993); Alan P. Klein, Reinventing the
Examination Process for Patent Applications Covering Software-Related Inventions, 13 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 231 (1995). For the practice abroad, which aims at
similar discriminations, but sometimes employs different tests, see, e.g., Hanneman, supra
note 17, at 85 (noting that U.S. and Japanese.patent offices were less restrictive in allowing
computer-related inventions than the European Patent Office); Kolle, supra note 19, at
663-69.
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nally, an investigative panel might have to consider state practice con-
cerning application of the international nonobviousness standard 34 to
the program-related inventions under review, which would immerse it
in one of the thorniest and most controversial issues of them all.
One must concede that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has relaxed the subject-matter barriers to patenta-
bility in a series of recent cases.36 However, neither that court, nor
the Supreme Court should it endorse this trend, possess the authority
to set standards for the rest of the world. Second-guessing the deci-
sions of domestic courts and administrators in these matters without
any consensually evolved international guidelines would only exacer-
bate the policy tensions surrounding software patents in general.37
In the meanwhile, if World Trade Organization (WTO) panels
were to delve into these matters in contentious cases, it would aug-
ment the member states' risk that the WTO's dispute-settlement ma-
chinery might end up resolving complex intellectual policy issues of
major domestic concern at the expense of domestic legislatures. This
prospect has already intrigued at least one leading commentator.38
Given the current lack of consensus concerning software-related pat-
ents and the overall preference for copyright protection of computer
34. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27(1) & n.5 (equating "inventive step"
with "non-obviousness"). It is not clear that, under the best of circumstances, efforts to
eliminate cultural and policy differences that lead different countries (or sometimes the
same country at different times) to expand or contract the nonobviousness standard will
prove susceptible to harmonization at the international level. Cf HAROLD C. WEGNER,
PATENT HARMONIZATION-BY TREATY OR DOMESTIC REFORM 84-86 (1990) (stating that
the "intricacies of the test of obviousness in each country are too much to iron out among
even the most skilled scholars and experts").
35. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2346. Scope of protection
issues are equally daunting. See, e.g., id. at 2345; Brian Kahin, The Software Patent Crisis,
TECH. REV., Apr. 1990, at 53, 58 (problem of overbroad software patents).
36. See In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacating In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re
Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994); USPTO Proposed Guidelines, supra note 32.
37. For example, in a major decision concerning the eligibility of a computer-program
related invention, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en
banc, produced five different opinions, three of which found at least six of the judges in
varying degrees of dissent. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For the intrac-
tability of these views, compare the majority opinion, id. at 1543-45 (quoted supra note 33)
with id. at 1545, 1564-65 (Archer, C.J., dissenting) (finding that the claimed invention, held
statutory by the majority, "is simply the mathematical conversion of data," and that the
claims merely recited "newly discovered mathematics and not the invention ... of a pro-
cess or product applying it"). For the larger policy tensions surrounding the patenting of
computer programs in general, see Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2343-47.
38. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 63-66; supra note 10; Paul Edward Geller,
Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements, 29
INT'L LAW. 99 (1995).
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programs expressed in the TRIPS Agreement itself,39 disinterested tri-
ers of fact could hardly fault WTO states that denied patent protec-
tion to most computer programs, provided the relevant courts and
administrators avoided the appearance of arbitrary or capricious deci-
sion-making.4 °
To the extent that some states do make computer program-re-
lated patents available to nationals for reasons of their own, they must
allow nationals of other member states to obtain them without dis-
crimination. All of these patentees become entitled to reap the bene-
fits of the TRIPS Agreement, except in their respective countries of
origin.41 For example, foreign patentees must be allowed to exercise
all the exclusive rights stipulated in the Agreement, including the ex-
clusive right to import the patented program42 for a period of at least
twenty years from the filing date.4 3 Although WTO Member states
may no longer impose forfeiture for failure to work such patents lo-
cally,44 foreign patentees do remain liable to compulsory licensing on
various grounds, including grounds of "abuse" if an appropriate judi-
cial or administrative body finds that the patentee has charged unrea-
sonably high prices.45 On the whole, the conditions governing the
issuance of compulsory licenses became more favorable to foreign
patentees than in the past.46
The national treatment and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses
of the TRIPS Agreement impose a firm obligation on states granting
program-related patents to open their markets to similarly qualified
foreign software inventions whether or not patentable in the inven-
tors' home countries and without obtaining any reciprocal degree of
patent protection for their own software inventions from countries
39. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 10; infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
40. See supra note 27; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(2) (stating that
"procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and
equitable").
41. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 1(3) (stating that "Members shall accord
the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of other Members"), 2(1)
(mandating compliance with Paris Convention, arts. 1-3), 4 (concerning Most-Favored-Na-
tion (MFN) Treatment).
42. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 28.
43. See id. art. 33; see also URAA, supra note 6, §§ 532-533 (amending 35 U.S.C. sec-
tions 154, 271 (1988) to extend duration of patents from 17 to 20 years from date of appli-
cation and to clarify that unauthorized imports and offers to sell constitute infringement).
44. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27(1) (stating that patent rights
shall be "[e]njoyable without discrimination as to ... whether products are imported or
locally produced") and id. art. 28(1) (recognizing exclusive right to import patented prod-
uct or product made from patented process) with Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 5A.
45. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 31, 40.
46. See id. art. 31; see generally Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, 355-57.
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that do not readily issue patents on similar inventions.4 7 This asym-
metry means that both developed and developing countries remain
free to determine the level of patent protection afforded computer
program-related inventions within their respective jurisdictions but
not free to impose their domestic policies on other member countries.
As a result, developed countries that increasingly issue patents on
computer programs could exclude infringing imports from developing
countries. But the former "could not prevent firms in developing
countries from ignoring these same patents at home or from exporting
competing products that did not violate copyright, trademark and
trade secret laws to third-country markets where such patents were
not given effect." 48
Over time, of course, state practice may evolve to the point where
patent protection of program-related inventions becomes more wide-
spread and uniform in character. Ongoing trade policy review exer-
cises, established by the TRIPS Agreement,49 could then logically
embrace this topic, and dispute-settlement panels might take greater
judicial notice of an emerging consensus. 50 This very evolution, how-
ever, might alarm many developing countries that managed to acquire
capacity in computer technology,5 1 and it would fuel earlier fears that
foreign software patents could condemn them to a chronically depen-
dent role as cheap suppliers of software services and little else.52 To
overcome the developing countries' reluctance to recognize a consen-
sus favoring broader international patent protection of computer pro-
grams (should such a consensus arise) states favoring stronger
protection would probably need to offer offsetting trade concessions
of interest to those countries. 3
47. See supra note 41.
48. TRIPS Component, supra note 8, at 202.
49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 71.
50. See, e.g., Geller, supra note 38, at 107-14.
51. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Develop-
ing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated World Market, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Discussion Paper No. 73, UNCTAD DOC. USG/
DP/73, Nov. 1993, at 11-14; see also Robert Schware, Software Industry Entry Strategies for
Developing Countries: A "Walking on Two Legs" Proposition, 20 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
143 (1992).
52. See TRIPS Component, supra note 8, at 200-01 (citing authorities).
53. See, e.g., Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 383 ("Compensation as
the Key to Future Concessions"); Maskus & Konan, supra note 23, at 412.
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B. Copyright Protection of Computer Software
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the United States argued unsuc-
cessfully that computer programs fell within the Berne Convention,54
which champions "the protection of the rights of authors in their liter-
ary and artistic works," and which broadly defines such works to "in-
clude every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression . . This
"unity of literature" thesis espoused by the United States since 1980,56
however, ignored the dual function of computer programs, a phenom-
enon that Professor Randall Davis captured when he stated that a
computer program "is a machine whose medium of construction hap-
pens to be text. '5 7 Other leading industrialized countries that empha-
sized the dual nature of computer software did not initially subscribe
to the full copyright approach.
For example, the French copyright law of 198558 effectively
treated computer programs in much the same way that the Berne
Convention allows states to treat "works of applied art '59 under a re-
gime built on modified copyright principles.6 ° In Germany, despite
54. See, e.g., Michael S. Keplinger, Authorship in the Information Age: Protection for
Computer Programs Under the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 21 COPYRIGHT
(W.I.P.O.) 119 (1985). But see S.J. Soltysinski, Protection of Computer Programs: Com-
parative and International Aspects, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1990)
(denying that Berne Convention required protection of software); Cornish, supra note 16,
at 185 (stating that there "was no basis for insisting that member states treat programs as
literary works within either the Berne or Universal Copyright Conventions").
55. Berne Convention, supra note 11, arts. 1, 2(1).
56. The "unity of literature" doctrine, which posits full copyright protection for com-
puter programs, contrasts with the "unity of art" doctrine in France, which posits full copy-
right protection of industrial designs. Paradoxically, the United States has historically
opposed the "unity of art" doctrine in France, and France recently opposed the "unity of
literature" approach in the United States. See, e.g., Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2483-
88 ("Limits of the 'Unity of Literature' Approach").
57. Randall Davis, Intellectual Property and Software: The Assumptions Are Broken,
in W.I.P.O. WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASPECTS OF AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 101, 110 (1991). See also Dennis S. Karjala, United States Adher-
ence to the Berne Convention and Copyright Protection of Information-Based Technologies,
28 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 149-50 (1988); Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2320-
24.
58. Loi no. 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits des auteurs et aux droits des
artistes-interprdtes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de viddogrammes et des en-
treprises de communication audiovisuelle, Titre V, arts. 45-51 (Des Logiciels) [Computer
Programs], 1985 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 7495, 7499
[hereinafter French Copyright Law of July 3, 1985] (codified in scattered sections of the
Code de la Propridtd Intellectuelle).
59. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, arts. 2(7), 7(4).
60. See, e.g., ANDRt- LUCAS, LE DROIT DE L'INFORMATIOUE 183-262 (1987); Philippe
Gaudrat, La protection des logiciels par le droit d'auteur, 138 R.I.D.A. 77 (1988); Legal
Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2481-83 ("A Sui Generis French Law").
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legislative recognition of computer programs as copyrightable subject
matter, the High Court disentitled routine programs from such protec-
tion by imposing strict standards of eligibility like those it had previ-
ously used to limit copyright protection of industrial art. The German
High Court relegated the bulk of these same programs to unfair com-
petition law, with a hint that this law could impede slavish duplica-
tion.61 Because state practice in these and other countries revealed a
lack of consensus, it was not clear that states disinclined to protect
computer programs at all were subject to any countervailing obliga-
tions under international law.62
1. Eligibility, Duration, and "TRIPS Treatment"
The TRIPS Agreement weighed into this controversy by pro-
claiming that "[c]omputer programs, whether in source or object code,
shall be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention
(1971). "163 All WTO member states must, therefore, confer copyright
protection on some computer programs, just as Berne Union coun-
tries had to confer copyright protection on some "works of applied
art" after this subject-matter category entered the Berne Convention
in 1948. 64 The TRIPS Agreement, however, says nothing about the
eligibility criteria that states must apply to this controversial subject
matter; nor, apart from a generalized exclusion of "ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such," which ap-
plies to all literary and artistic works in general,65 does the Agreement
concern itself with scope of protection or other issues that have taxed
domestic courts. Hence, just as WTO member states remain free to
apply their own criteria for distinguishing between copyrightable
works of applied art and noncopyrightable industrial designs,66 they
might argue that the decision to treat computer programs "as literary
61. See, e.g., Thomas Dreier, Program Protection in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many-A New Decision Leaves Inkasso Program Intact, 7 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 178
(1991); Ulrich Lowenheim, Legal Protection for Computer Programs in West Germany, 4
HiGH TECH. L.J. 178, 179 (1989) (discussing protection of computer programs in German
unfair competition law prior to E.C. Directive on copyright protection for software).
62. See supra note 54. States unwilling to protect foreign software might even have
argued that foreign software producers were not entitled to national treatment under do-
mestic laws, on the grounds that software fell outside the Berne Convention. Cf, e.g.,
Cornish, supra note 16, at 185 (stressing the fact that computer programs were not named
as subject matter covered by international conventions).
63. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 10(1).
64. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright
Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143,
1160-64 [hereinafter Designs Before 1976].
65. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 9(2).
66. See, e.g., Designs Before 1976, supra note 64, at 1166-70.
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works" did not preclude them from modifying general principles of
copyright law not addressed in the TRIPS Agreement to limit the pro-
tection of computer programs as "applied literature. 67
To be sure, the European Community's Council Directive on
Computer Programs68 will override inconsistent provisions of the do-
mestic laws, which should vitiate both the eligibility standards under
prior German law and some of the sui generis dispositions of the
French law.69 However, the European Directive imposes tailor-made
limitations of its own that deviate from the classical copyright para-
digm of the past;70 while the Japanese copyright provisions concerning
software-adopted under strenuous pressures from the United
States-may turn out to be quirkier than they appear on the surface.71
The point is that, even disregarding the crucial scope of protection
issues discussed below, the treatment of computer programs "as liter-
ary works" under the TRIPS Agreement will turn largely on state
practice for the foreseeable future, and not on treaty law. States that
are not afraid to "tweak the giants' beards" might, therefore, plausibly
introduce measures, for example, to restrict eligibility, like those that
leading developed countries have employed against disfavored sub-
ject-matter categories in the past.72 Recalcitrant states could not,
however, limit the duration of protection on analogy to works of ap-
67. In actual practice, no state or group of states has simply applied the mature copy-
right paradigm to computer programs without tailor-made adjustments of considerable sig-
nificance. See Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 371 n.196-98 (citing
authorities). But see Andrd Kevever, Le GATT et le droit d'auteur international, 47 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 629, 634-35 (1994) (rejecting "applied literature"
approach).
68. European Community's Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter E.C. Directive on Computer
Programs].
69. See, e.g., Thomas Dreier, The International Development of Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW, supra note 16,
at 217, 226-27 (case of Germany); Andrd Lucas, The Council Directive of 14 May 1991
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and Its Implications in French
Law, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (E.I.P.R.) 28 (1992).
70. See, e.g., E.C. Directive on Computer Programs, supra note 68, arts. 1-8; see also
Jean-Frangois Verstrynge, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights within the New Pan-Euro-
pean Framework: Computer Software, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW
supra note 16, at 1, 3-10; Michael Lehmann, The European Directive on the Protection of
Computer Programs, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW, supra, at 163, 168-
179.
71. See, e.g., TERUO Doi, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND MANAGE-
MENT-LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 93-121 (1992); 4 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, ch. 9
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1995); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Software in
the United States and Japan (pts. 1 & 2), 6 E.I.P.R. 195 (1991), 7 E.I.P.R. 231 (Pt. 2)
(1991).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
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plied art,73 as they might have done before the TRIPS Agreement.
This follows because Article 12 of that Agreement expressly imposes
minimum terms of protection for all classes of works, except photo-
graphic works and works of applied art.74
Because computer software now qualifies for protection under
the TRIPS Agreement, and that Agreement builds on the Berne Con-
vention,75 even producers who are hampered by unorthodox eligibility
requirements at home should obtain national treatment abroad, with-
out regard to any lack of reciprocity. 76 All foreign producers (as dis-
tinct from nationals in the countries of origin)77 should also benefit
automatically from the formidable array of international minimum
standards that the TRIPS Agreement confers. For example, foreign
copyright proprietors should obtain the exclusive rights specified in
the Berne Convention,78 the rental rights conferred on computer pro-
grams under the TRIPS Agreement,79 and the guaranteed minimum
term of protection as specified in both of these documents.8 " In addi-
tion, rights holders benefit from all the enforcement measures that the
TRIPS Agreement mandates,8 including the right to obtain prelimi-
nary injunctions82 and the right to exclude the importation of "coun-
73. See supra notes 59, 66 and accompanying text.
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 12 (requiring minimum 50-year term of pro-
tection when life of natural person is not the basis of duration, except for photographic
works and applied art).
75. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 9(1); supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
76. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 5(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7,
arts. 1(3), 3, 4.
77. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 1(3), 3(1); Berne Convention, supra
note 11, art. 5(1),(3) ("Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law");
id. art. 5(4) (criteria for determining the country of origin). In principle, WTO countries
may continue to discriminate against national copyright owners, unless domestic law other-
wise specifies.
78. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, arts. 8-14ter.
79. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 14.
80. See supra note 74. In the United States, nationals of other WTO countries may
also benefit from provisions in the Berne Convention that prevent technical forfeitures of
copyrighted works whose terms of protection had not expired at the time this country
joined the Union. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 18; TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 7, art. 70(2),(3); URAA, supra note 6, § 514, amending 17 U.S.C. § 104(A) (1988)
(restoring rights of foreign copyright owners, including producers of sound recordings, who
technically forfeited their copyrights under specified conditions of prior U.S. law).
81. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 41-61. Article 41 states in part:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of in-
fringement... including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and rem-
edies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.
Id. art. 41.
82. See id. art. 50.
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terfeit trademark" or "pirated copyright goods."'8 3 Their national
trade representatives may also resort to dispute-settlement procedures
to combat lax enforcement in recalcitrant states.84
This potent battery of rights and remedies will greatly benefit
software exporters seeking to repress the sales of cheaply made, literal
or wholesale copies of their copyrighted programs in the worldwide
marketplace envisioned by the Uruguay Round. To be sure, the
TRIPS Agreement might have achieved a comparable result by for-
bidding slavish imitation of computer programs for a fixed period
under Article lObis of the Paris Convention, 85 and the failure to take
this route, or some other alternative, may have undermined the histor-
ical mission and economic functions of the mature copyright para-
digm.86 Nevertheless, the end results-by whatever means-provide
a much more workable and effective legal framework for combatting
copycat duplicators than ever before.
Consider, for example, that if China were a member of the WTO,
United States pressures to stop the duplication of its nationals' copy-
righted computer programs could be exerted against China within a
multilateral framework. The practices tolerated by the Chinese gov-
ernment would, moreover, violate specific international minimum
standards, and all the mediatory and dispute-settlement procedures of
the WTO Agreement would become available, including cross retalia-
tory sanctions.87 In other words, the same pressures in that context
would avoid the taint of unilateral interference in the internal affairs
of another sovereign state that had not expressly recognized the
norms on which the complaining state relied as binding internation-
83. See id. arts. 51-60 ("Special Requirements Related to Border Control Measures").
For this purpose, "counterfeit trademark goods" are defined as "goods, including packag-
ing, bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly
registered in respect of such goods" and "pirated copyright goods" are defined as unau-
thorized direct copies of protected articles the making of which would have infringed
either copyright law or related rights law in the country of importation. Id. art. 51 n.14.
84. See TRIPS Agreements, supra note 7, arts. 63-64; Understanding on Disputes,
supra note 10.
85. See Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 10bis; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO
THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (As REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967) 142-46 (1968).
86. See, e.g., Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2483-88. Arguably, copyright protection
of computer programs converts that law into a de facto industrial property law; the gener-
ous modalities of copyright law, as devised to regulate the specialized market for cultural
goods, then disrupt the general products market, which the patent paradigm supposedly
governs. See further Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, supra note 14.
87. See supra note 10; see generally Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at
385-88.
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ally.88 It would also preclude the accused state from imposing unilat-
eral sanctions of its own without risk of retaliation by the trading
community as a whole.
2. Scope of Protection
The shortcomings inherent in the TRIPS approach surface the
moment one turns from wholesale copying of computer programs to
the practice of reimplementing functional components of a protected
program in "clones, . . . near clones .. . [and] partial clones":89 that is,
in programs that are independently coded and that yet deliver essen-
tially the same functional performance or behavior as the originator's
own software. The competitor's non-literal "copying," in whole or
substantial part, may imitate functional design aspects of the origina-
tor's program, but will not usually duplicate the code except as needed
to achieve interoperability or to extract noncopyrightable ideas. 90 In
such cases, the copyright holder's efforts to prove infringement have
generally been unavailing, at least in the United States federal appel-
late courts.9 Neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Berne Conven-
tion seem likely to reverse this trend because they say little or nothing
about the scope of protection that copyrighted computer programs
should receive "as literary works."
As noted, the TRIPS Agreement (but not the Berne Convention)
does specify that copyright protection shall extend only "to expres-
sions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathe-
88. The propositions in the text ignore the effect of emerging customary international
norms. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 2, at 531-33 (espousing tacit consent theory of cus-
tomary norms if states participated in forums for multilateral law-making initiatives).
89. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2381. As to the nature and size
of software entities, the Manifesto distinguishes among five such entities: program code (as
a behaving entity); program compilations as a whole (the industrial design of program
behavior and the internal components responsible for producing it); subcompilations (sub-
sets of program behavior or internal design for producing behavior); algorithms (finite
procedures for solving particular problems); and features (coherent units of program be-
havior). Id. at 2379. Copyright law protects only program code from wholesale or partial
appropriations. Id. at 2347-61. Concerning the similarity of product and market dimen-
sions, the Manifesto distinguishes among: 1) exact duplications of program code; 2) clones
and near-clones (which are identical or near-identical compilations of program elements,
whether program behavior or the industrial designs responsible for program behavior); 3)
partial clones (clones of subcompilations); 4) substantially similar program compilations; 5)
substantially different program compilations; and 6) programs with the same general func-
tionality but different particularized functionality. Id. at 2381-405.
90. See id. at 2395-405.
91. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. Whether the United States
Supreme Court will approve this trend remains to be seen. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Bor-
land Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
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matical concepts as such."9 2 But the implementation of this idea-
expression distinction is left to the domestic laws, and the Berne Con-
vention lays down no detailed guidelines to determine the scope of
protection beyond literal copying.93 Thus, WTO panels engaged in
dispute-settlement proceedings must once again fall back upon state
practice.94 State practice everywhere reflects a dilemma concerning
the breadth of protection to be afforded copyrightable computer pro-
grams,95 especially with regard to the copyright holder's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works.96
Most computer programs (and many computerized data bases)
evolve through revision, adaptation, and transformation into an array
of applications that are functionally "derived" from the data and in-
structions embodied in the program designer's (or compiler's) initial
solution.
By persuading courts to overextend the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works, copyright owners can assert proprietary claims to
any subsequent innovations that exploit recognizable aggregates of
the original data and instruction sets, even though the matter
claimed to have been infringed contains ... no personal expression
and fulfills purely functional objectives.97
92. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 9(2).
93. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 69, at 232-34 (discussing W.I.P.O.'s proposed Protocol
to the Berne Convention, which aims to reduce the ambiguities pertaining to scope of
protection and other issues as matters stand); see also T. Vinje, The Legislative History of
the E.C. Software Directive, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW, supra note
16, at 39, 79 ("The line between idea and expression will have to be drawn in each individ-
ual case."). See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 13 (paraphrasing Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 11, art. 9(2), to the effect that states must "[c]onfine limitations or
exceptions to the exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a nor-
mal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder."). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (codified fair-use criteria).
94. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 63-66; Understanding on Disputes, supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 69, at 227-30; Vinje, supra note 93, at 45-52, 56-79.
96. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(3); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CON-
VENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 286-95
(1987); cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 106(2) (1988).
97. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 12, at 457. See, e.g., Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (broad protection for
elements of structure, sequence, and organization), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
Over-extending the derivative work right
proves especially harmful when the "sets of instructions" or the "collections of
data" at issue pertain to functionally efficient or standardized solutions that pru-
dent second comers will prefer to work around in order to forestall actions for
infringement. Carried to an extreme, the very process of standardization needed
for the progress of artificial intelligence could enable early generations of pro-
grammers and systems analysts to lodge derivative work claims against those who
use the unpatented prior art as components or building blocks in later, more ad-
vanced achievements.
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As a result, domestic appellate courts wary of this pitfall tend increas-
ingly to treat computer programs as functional works entitled to little
more than "thin" protection against slavish imitation.98 This emerging
state practice, in turn, substitutes a chronic condition of underprotec-
tion for the chronic state of overprotection that would otherwise suf-
focate unpatented, incremental innovation in this field.99
In the United States, for example, the federal appellate courts
apply a "successive filtering test" that bars a finding of infringement
based on nonliteral similarities pertaining to "sets of modules neces-
sary for efficient operations, to structural architecture bearing on effi-
ciency, or to any technical ideas present in different structural
subcomponents of the programs at issue."'100 These courts refuse to
find protectable expression in "elements dictated by external factors,
including standard programming techniques, mechanical specifica-
tions, compatibility requirements, manufacturers' design standards,
and functional demands [peculiar to] the industry being served."'' 1
Important federal appellate decisions also condone the decompilation
of an object code in the course of reverse-engineering noncopyright-
able technical ideas or components that a second comer could not rea-
sonably discover by other means. This decompilation is allowed
provided the second comer independently creates his own end prod-
ucts without embodying the originator's protectable expression, espe-
Electronic Information Tools, supra, at 457-58. See also Pamela Samuelson, Computer Pro-
grams, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of
Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (Spring 1992) [hereinafter Samuel-
son, User Interfaces; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
98. See infra notes 100, 102 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2330-43, 2347-61; Electronic
Information Tools, supra note 97, at 458-61.
100. TRIPS Component, supra note 8, at 231. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49
F.3d 807 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995); Engineering Dynamics,
Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-49 (5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,
960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992); Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n
v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
But see Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d 1222.
101. TRIPS Component, supra note 8, at 231. See supra note 100 and accompanying
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cially code. °2 The United States Supreme Court will soon determine
the extent to which these principles also apply to user interfaces.10 3
Whether European courts operating under domestic laws that im-
plement the Council Directive on Computer Programs'0 4 will reach
comparable results also remains to be determined. 105 Meanwhile, the
EC Directive already constitutes a tailor-made law that modifies the
classical copyright paradigm in subtle and sometimes controversial
ways that have few counterparts in prior state practice.'0 6 Knowl-
edgeable observers predict that the Directive as judicially interpreted
will ultimately provide only "thin" protection against wholesale copy-
ing, and they welcome this outcome as a victory for European
policymakers.'0 7
If these tendencies prevail at the international level, copyright
protection of computer programs under the TRIPS Agreement will
provide a basis for preventing wholesale duplication of outer, expres-
sive features, whether in source or object code. 10 8 But neither copy-
right laws nor trade secret laws, as reinforced by the TRIPS
Agreement,10 9 prevent reimplementation of functionally equivalent
behavior by proper means. Moreover, they will not impede competi-
102. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-41 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Brief Amicus Curiae
of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 33
JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1992). But cf. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511, 517-19 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
103. Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 807. See generally Samuelson, User Interfaces, supra
note 97; Pamela Samuelson, The Nature of Copyright Analysis for Computer Programs:
Copyright Law Professors' Brief Amicus Curiae in Lotus v. Borland, 16 HASTINGS COMM/
ENT L.J. 657 (1994).
104. See supra note 68.
105. See, e.g., Vinje, supra note 93, at 79-81; Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S. and
E.C. Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More Different Than They
Seem?, 13 J.L. & COM. 279 (1994); infra note 106 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Dreier, supra note 69, at 218-38; see also Sam Ricketson, People or
Machines: The Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1991); Jan Corbet, Le developpement technique conduit-il a un
changement de la notion d'auteur?, 148 R.I.D.A. 58 (1991).
107. See, e.g., Michael Lehmann, supra note 70, at 165, 172 (stating that "[t]he reverse
analysis . . . permitted under Art. 5(3), combined with decompilation under Art. 6, can
serve to determine the ideas and principles-themselves free of copyright-which underlie
any program .... Free access to the ideas is therefore ... guaranteed, and cannot be
excluded by contract"). Cf also Paul Goldstein, The E. C. Software Directive: A View from
the United States of America, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW, supra note
16, at 202, 205-15.
108. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 10(1) (requiring protection of computer
programs as literary works "whether in source or object code"); supra text accompanying
notes 75-86.
109. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39; infra text accompanying notes 118-
127.
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tors from imitating components that are functionally determined or
that constitute standards of efficiency in the trade or other market-
determined standards. 1 ' A WTO panel empowered to investigate a
member state's allegedly inadequate protection of computer programs
would thus have to conclude that, in the present state of uncertainty,
the defendant state's administrators and tribunals were largely free to
follow the more restrictive lines of decisions implementing copyright
protection for computer programs in developed countries, as indicated
above.
If, over time, state practice evolves towards a stronger, more pro-
tectionist consensus, then deviant states might find themselves
charged with "nonviolatory acts of nullification and impairment" of
benefits conferred by the TRIPS Agreement' unless they agreed to
broaden the scope of protection. This explains why the developing
countries bargained for, and obtained, a five-year moratorium on
claims of nonviolatory nullification and impairment." 2 At present
and for the foreseeable future, however, the prospects strongly favor
the "thin protection" doctrine that the United States federal appellate
courts have lately developed, unless the Supreme Court disavows this
approach.Y3 Even then, the United States Supreme Court does not
make law for the rest of the world, and especially not for the develop-
ing countries. Moreover, facile claims of "nonviolatory acts" stem-
ming from scope of protection issues on which no firm consensus has
emerged could backfire if they lead WTO panels to resolve controver-
sial intellectual property issues at the international level, with adverse
repercussions on domestic firms or industries whose own legislative
and administrative authorities were thereby circumvented."
4
One further disadvantage of the TRIPS approach to computer
programs deserves emphasis here. It seems that the developed coun-
tries' negotiators-in pressing for the treatment of 'computer pro-
grams "as literary works"-have overlooked or downplayed the fact
110. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99 (1879); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989);
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); J.H. Reichman, Com-
puter Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for
Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REv. 639, 690-93, 693 n.288 (1989)
[hereinafter Programs as Know-How].
111. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 64(1); Universal Minimum Standards,
supra note 8, at 385-87.
112. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 64(2).
113. See supra notes 100-102, 110 and accompanying text; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.), cert. granted - U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
114. See GATT Connection, supra note 1, at 861. But see Geller, supra note 38, at 107-
14 (favoring actions by WTO panels to fill gaps in international intellectual property law).
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that the developing countries were already entitled to differential and
more favorable treatment1 15 with respect to copyrightable literary
works under the Appendix added to the Berne Convention in 1971.116
In this connection, developing countries that have long complained
about the high prices their students and trainees must pay to acquire
computer programs for educational and scientific purposes may at-
tempt to invoke the compulsory licenses provided in the Appendix for
these purposes.' 17
In retrospect, as this author's previous studies have shown, the
decision to entrust the protection of computer programs to the Berne
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement "as literary works," with no
corresponding prohibitions against the copying of non-copyrightable
functional components, may boomerang against its proponents at the
international level. In effect, it endows competitors "who are willing
to master lawful techniques of reverse engineering" with broad lati-
tude to imitate the foreign originators' non-copyrightable know-how
without any corresponding burdens to contribute to the originators'
costs of research and development." 8
C. Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition Law
Paradoxically, software producers may ultimately benefit as much
or more from provisions in the TRIPS Agreement requiring WTO
members to protect undisclosed information 19 and to repress unfair
competition 120 as from the copyright provisions analyzed above. In
particular, Article 39(2) provides that "[n]atural and legal persons
115. In principle, the TRIPS Agreement-unlike prior multilateral trade agreements-
provides no special regime that weakens the international minimum standards as such for
developing countries. Instead, the TRIPS Agreement distinguishes among developed, de-
veloping and least-developed countries primarily for purposes of differentiating the length
of the grace periods during which these countries may respectively delay implementation
of the substantive international minimum standards. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7,
art. 65(1) (one-year transition period for all member countries), 65(2), (3) (five-year transi-
tion period for developing countries), 66(1) (ten-year transitional period for least-devel-
oped countries). For the view that both developing and least-developing countries will, in
practice, be able to assert de facto claims to preferential treatment under other provisions
of both the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO Agreement, supra note 5, see generally Uni-
versal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 385-88 ("Uncertainties of the Dispute-Settle-
ment Process").
116. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, Appendix; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7,
art. 9(1); GATT Connection, supra note 1, at 822-27 ("Preferential treatment under the
Copyright Conventions"). See generally S. RICKETSON, supra note 96, at 624-64.
117. See TRIPS Component, supra note 8, at 234-35.
118. See id. at 233-34; See also infra text accompanying notes 121-126.
119. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39.
120. See id. art. 3(1) (incorporating Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. l0bis by
reference).
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shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within
their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices" so long as such information remains secret, has commercial
value, and has been subject to reasonable steps to keep it secret.121
Examples of the honest commercial practices the drafters had in mind
are spelled out in a footnote to Article 39(2).122 A failure to observe
these practices in connection with internationally traded goods, in-
cluding software, is understood to violate Article lObis of the Paris
Convention as well as Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement.123 By the
same token, Article lObis of the Paris Convention, which is automati-
cally incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, elevates practices that
deceive or confuse consumers to the level of a universal tort, actiona-
ble within the purview of the TRIPS Agreement's overall enforce-
ment machinery.' 24
While a detailed analysis of these provisions lies beyond the
scope of this paper, 125 companies that establish themselves in develop-
ing countries, either directly or through licensees, should especially
benefit from them. For example, once domestic laws to protect undis-
closed information are enacted in conformity with Article 39, a com-
petitor whose conduct violates its provisions may become incapable of
profiting, at least for a reasonable period, from the improper acquisi-
tion of functional know-how that copyright laws otherwise left unpro-
tected.126 Similarly, the unfair competition norms incorporated into
the TRIPS Agreement via Article lObis of the Paris Convention allow
even distant suppliers to complain locally about practices that deceive
or confuse consumers, like those currently prohibited under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act in the United States. 127 Competitors who
121. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2).
122. Id. art. 39(2) n.10, which states:
For the purpose of this provision, "a manner contrary to honest commercial prac-
tices" shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confi-
dence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed
information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to
know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition.
123. See supra notes 120-121.
124. See supra note 120; Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and Interna-
tional Trade, supra note 14, at 106-07.
125. See Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 377-79, 381.
126. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights, in University-Generated
Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 51, 93-
98 (1993) [hereinafter Overlapping Proprietary Rights].
127. See, e.g., DORis E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LANHAM ACr 94-170,
213-26 (1993); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 85, at 142-46; see also J.H. Reichman, Design
Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational Per-
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otherwise imitate only noncopyrightable, functional components of a
foreign national's computer programs may, by copying trademarks or
trade dress at the same time, become liable on these grounds without
violating the copyright laws as such.
II
Closing the Know-How Gap in the TRIPS
Agreement
The hard truth this analysis confirms is that the world's intellec-
tual property system, as currently constituted, is not equipped to deal
with the real problem posed by twenty-first century technological de-
velopment, namely: how to protect subpatentable advances in techni-
cal and scientific know-how that are costly to develop and yet easily
appropriated when applied to industrial products distributed in the
open market.128 Two recently published monographs in the Columbia
Law Review deal exhaustively with this topic. One, entitled Legal
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,29 explores the
need for a general purpose innovation law, built on modified liability
principles, that would stimulate investment in all technological pur-
suits whose products and processes obtain inadequate protection from
either the domestic patent and copyright laws or from classical trade
secret laws. The second monograph, entitled A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,13° is the joint product of
two technical experts, Professor Randall Davis of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and Mitchell Kapor, founder of the Lotus De-
velopment Corporation, and two law professors, Pamela Samuelson of
Pittsburgh University, and this writer.1 31 The Manifesto identifies the
true sources of value in computer programs and explains in a techni-
spective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 81-123 ("Concurrent Protection of Trade-Dress: The
Judge-Made Design Law"). While enactment of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act had
become necessary in order for the United States to conform to art. l0bis of the Paris Con-
vention, it should be emphasized that this article concerns acts of deception and confusion,
not product simulation as such. See generally GATT Connection, supra note 1, at 769-96
("Nonexistence of an International Norm Against Misappropriation"). Nevertheless,
product simulation may violate the domestic unfair competition laws of many developed
countries. See, e.g., ERIC GOLAZ, L'IMITATION SERVILE DES PRODUITS ET DE LEUR PRfS-
ENTATION 103-21 (1992) (cases of France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland); Legal Hy-
brids, supra note 13, at 2472-77 (technology protection in unfair competition laws of Japan
and Switzerland).
128. See generally Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2436-42, 2504-27 (market failure due
to contraction of lead time in design dependent technologies under modern conditions,
synthesized in the problem of "incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face").
129. Legal Hybrids, supra note 13.
130. Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13.
131. See further supra note 13.
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cally sound manner why they fall through the gaps in the domestic and
international intellectual property systems. To protect the functional
components of computer programs that find no refuge in existing legal
regimes, the Manifesto proposes a modified liability regime that over-
comes the problem of market failure without creating new barriers to
entry or other anti-competitive effects characteristic of exclusive prop-
erty rights. 32
The following observations draw from and briefly summarize
some of the main findings set out in these monographs, with a view to
indicating the author's overall solution to the deeper problems raised
in this study.
A. A Market-Oriented Framework for Protecting Program Design
The Manifesto argues that software producers need some form of
protection from competitors who quickly enter the market with clones
and near clones,133 but that exclusive property rights derived from the
patent and copyright paradigms fail to solve the real problem because
they trade the prospects of chronic overprotection for the state of
chronic underprotection innovators now face. The real problem is not
the protection of "text" or code, which is what attracts copyright pro-
tection and leads to the dead end discussed in this study. Rather, the
main source of value in computer programs lies in the useful behavior
produced when program instructions are executed. In other words,
purchasers "pay substantial sums of money for a program not because
they have any intrinsic interest in what its text says, but because they
value what it does and how well it does it (its behavior)."' 34
This valuable behavior results from the industrial design phase of
software development, including the design of its interfaces, and not
from writing the source code to implement it, which is far less creative
and intellectually challenging, and commands a relatively insignificant
share of the innovator's overall investment in research and develop-
ment.135 The problem is that the software designer's know-how re-
sponsible for the valuable behavior that attracts consumers becomes
embodied in or near the surface of the program itself and cannot be
132. See also Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, supra note 14 (comparative
and historical analysis of the gaps in the international intellectual property system as struc-
tured in the late nineteenth century). The models that are explored in the context of com-
puter programs, see Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2413-29, illustrate the
approach that an innovation law ought to take with respect to application of modem tech-
nological know-how to industry in general. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2529-57.
133. Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2332-65.
134. Id. at 2318.
135. See id. at 2327-31.
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kept under lock and key in the factory, as would be the case with
conventional machinery. Any competitor who lawfully obtains a copy
of a computer program may be able to duplicate quickly its functional
design know-how without having to invest in the high cost of reverse-
engineering that second comers had typically to defray in order to
compete with innovators in a pre-digital age. 136
The vulnerability of the software producer's investment in design-
rich technical solutions to trivial acquisition by second comers thus
creates a risk of market failure. This, in turn, destabilizes the legal
and economic machinery that usually drives innovation by balancing
incentives to create against the benefits of free competition. More
specifically, cloners and near cloners may deprive software developers
of "natural lead time," 117 and they foster risk aversion owing to the
software innovators' chronic fears of being unable to appropriate the
fruits of their investments. 38
136. See id. at 2332-42 (explaining that much of this design know-how is borne on the
face of software.products (i.e., revealed through use of the program or in user manuals) or
near the face (i.e., accessible through decompilation of publicly distributed object code));
see also Programs as Know-How, supra note 110, at 652-67; Elmer Galbi, Proposal for New
Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 280, 281
(1969). Cloners and near cloners may accordingly obtain the innovator's costly know-how
by what the Manifesto calls "trivial acquisition of behavioral equivalence." See Samuelson
et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2337, 2381; see generally id. at 2332-41. They may also
drive the innovators out of the market altogether by pricing their clones lower than the
innovators' average costs and by out-distributing them to the point where innovators can-
not recoup their investment in research and development.
137. See supra note 136; Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2438-41 (showing that the
"temporary or 'disappearing' quantum of natural lead time" that trade secret laws (or
other laws protecting confidential information) traditionally supplied "solves the free rider
problem that would otherwise skew decisions to invest in the development of unpatented,
noncopyrightable products and processes, without resort to arbitrarily imposed barriers to
entry characteristic of all regimes built around exclusive property rights"); see also John C.
Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962).
138. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2378. The Manifesto states:
Market failure is likely if the quantum and significance of the entity taken is sub-
stantial, the second comer's development effort is rapid, easy, and highly depen-
dent orti he first comer's product, the degree of similarity in the resulting products
approaches identicality, and the second comer's market is proximate to that in
which the first comer operates. The converse is also true: the smaller the taking,
the less dependent the creation, the less similar the results, and the less proximate
the markets, the less likely it is that a second comer's borrowing will undermine
the first comer's incentives to invest in innovation.
Id. at 2378-79. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Assymetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Di-
lemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 861-67 (1992); Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78
VA. L. REV. 149, 222-58 (1992) (discussing a proposed tort of "malcompetitive copying").
In this context, the Manifesto suggests that the "look and feel" lawsuits are not really
about the arrangement of user interface command terms, but about the imitation of pro-
gram behavior, a phenomenon that has been obscured from view because the copyright
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When software developers turn to the domestic intellectual prop-
erty laws for relief against this threat of market failure, they are either
sadly disappointed or unduly overcompensated. They will normally
be disappointed by classical patent doctrines, which deny protection
for routine or incremental innovation; by classical copyright doctrines,
which deny protection for functionally determined design solutions as
such; and by classical trade secret laws (or equivalent laws of confi-
dential information), which only supply innovators with natural lead
time when they keep their know-how secret and do not embody it in
products distributed in the open market.139 Yet, these legal regimes
will sometimes unduly reward the very same innovators if, for exam-
ple, the latter persuade the patent office to lower the standard of non-
obviousness in order to rescue functional designs that have nowhere
else to go; 140 or if they persuade courts to expand traditional copyright
law to rescue functional design components of programs and inter-
faces that have nowhere else to go; 141 or if, by chance, they can avoid
public distribution altogether and license their programs under two-
party transactions that forbid reverse-engineering even by honest
means.
42
The Manifesto proposes to curb this risk of market failure by ad-
dressing the real problem at issue, which is the inability of trade secret
laws to supply software innovators with natural lead time in which to
recoup their investment in the functional design components of their
products. 43 The goal, however, is not to reward innovators with ex-
clusive property rights in less than nonobvious innovation, but rather
to restore the basis for healthy competition in a manner that is the
least disruptive of the normal competitive process.
vocabulary has no way of conceiving it. Similarly, the decompilation controversy is not
really about the harm caused by intermediate reproductions of program code in the effort
to discern its contents, but about the harm that may occur because the most valuable as-
pects of the internal design of programs cannot be adequately protected by existing legal
regimes once they are discerned in the analysis phase of the decompilation process. See id.
at 2339-42, 2350, 2389-93.
139. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2332-65; see also Overlapping
Proprietary Rights, supra note 126, at 88-109, 122-24.
140. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Competition Law, Intellectual Property and International Trade, supra
note 14, at 87-94; Electronic Information Tools, supra note 12, at 461-67 ("Public Interest at
Odds with the Two-Party Deal").
143. Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2378-413; see generally Legal Hy-
brids, supra note 13, at 2436-46, 2519-57.
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B. Toward a New Intellectual Property Regime Built on Modified
Liability Principles
To attain this goal, it is not necessary to change the existing copy-
right and patent laws, or otherwise to undermine the capacity of the
former to protect text (and other forms of surface expression) or the
capacity of the latter to protect applications of major breakthroughs in
computer science to industry.1" It is necessary for reformers to ad-
dress the right problem, namely, the second comer's ability rapidly to
acquire unpatented, noncopyrightable design solutions responsible for
incremental improvements in program behavior. These advances be-
come vulnerable to free-riding appropriators because classical trade
secret law denies any quantum of natural lead time to innovators who
cannot defend their subpatentable know-how by self-help measures to
preserve and enhance actual secrecy. Yet, were trade secret law avail-
able, it would not provide innovators with exclusive property rights at
all. On the contrary, it would only protect the innovator against the
dishonest conduct of second comers who attempt to avoid the duty to
reverse-engineer by proper means. 145
144. Supra text accompanying notes 19-21, 31-35, 63-86.
145. See supra notes 121-126; see generally Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2436-46. A
study of the many legal hybrids proliferating in the penumbra between the patent and
copyright paradigms suggests that the quintessential problem facing twenty-first century
innovation in an information age is precisely this chronic shortage of natural lead time that
results from the breakdown of classical trade secret laws (or equivalent laws of confidential
information) under present-day conditions. See Legal Hybrids, supra, at 2453-520; Col-
lapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, supra note 14, at 505-19. To overcome the result-
ing market failure, which depresses the level of aggregate investment in cumulative and
sequential forms of unpatented innovation, see, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2674 (1994), the
solution is to rationalize the economic functions of trade secret law and to obviate the
arbitrary and capricious effects of its functional dependence on actual secrecy. On analy-
sis, trade secret law turns out to be a kind of standardized agreement (a set of default
liability rules) governing relations between innovators and borrowers with respect to un-
patented innovation. These rules perform three essential functions: 1) they provide inno-
vators with a period of natural lead time in which to try to recoup their investments; 2)
they require borrowers to contribute to the technical community's overall costs of research
and development either indirectly, by investing in reverse engineering (and the improve-
ments to which it usually leads), or directly, by purchasing the innovative know-how under
licensing agreements; and 3) they trigger sister legal doctrines of misuse (drawn from anti-
trust law) that prevent licensors of unpatented technical know-how from neutralizing their
licensees' technical abilities to compete with licensors beyond a reasonably short period of
time. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2519-29.
The Legal Hybrids monograph contends that a general purpose innovation law to pro-
tect applications of unpatented technical know-how to industry under modern conditions
should perform these same economic functions without regard to the availability of actual
or legal secrecy as such. Id. at 2533-44. Such a regime would provide
those who invest in industrial applications of advanced technical know-how with
1) artificial lead time to overcome market failure; 2) with a menu of user's fees
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In this same vein, the Manifesto endorses a market-oriented set of
default rules for protecting novel software designs that would imple-
ment modified liability principles, and not the exclusive property
rights typical of other hybrid legal regimes. In particular, it recom-
mends the application of such a regime to protect software producers
against "clones, near-clones and partial clones" because the industrial
compilations of applied know-how embodied in programs cannot ade-
quately be protected by existing legal regimes. 4 6 Anti-cloning protec-
tion should last "long enough to give developers sufficient lead time to
develop a niche in the market, but not so long as to impede the incre-
mental development of technology or the creation of new de facto
standards in the marketplace."' 47
To this end, the Manifesto combines two mechanisms for provid-
ing a market-preserving form of relief. The first mechanism is a short
blocking period available to software developers from the first com-
mercial distribution of their software products. The second one con-
sists of the opportunity to register an innovative (but not inventive)
program compilation or subcompilation as a way of providing the reg-
istrant with compensation for a second comer's use of the innovation
after the expiration of the initial blocking period. 4 '
The proposed software regime would, of course, prevent whole-
sale cloning of novel functional features for a relatively short period of
time, maybe for a three or four-year blocking period, available even to
innovators who do not register their contributions with the relevant
administrative agency. This would delay producers of programs that
were substantially identical reimplementations of earlier programs
from entering the market before the allotted period of artificial lead
that sensibly allocates contributions to the costs of research and development
among members of the relevant technical community; and 3) with a common set
of pro-competitive ground rules that also make it possible for the relevant techni-
cal communities to take collective action to enforce and adjust the liability frame-
work ultimately adopted.
Id. at 2535. This "default liability regime for applied know-how" would stimulate invest-
ment in technological innovation by means of an inherently pro-competitive menu of op-
tions that benefitted both innovators and borrowers without harming the public interest in
free competition. See id. at 2539-44, 2548-51; infra note 153.
146. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2369-71, 2422-25.
147. Id. at 2423.
148. Id. at 2422-26. The authors of the Manifesto do not provide a model law because
their goal was to offer a useful framework for assessing what kinds of program innovations
are in need of what kind of legal protection and why. The first step was to clarify the terms
of the debate and set it on a firmer foundation than in the past, from which the construc-
tion of an appropriately minimalist legal framework becomes feasible. For the six struc-
tural elements of a general purpose innovation law that addresses these same concerns, see
Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2544-57 ("In Search of a Community-Wide Know-How
Transaction").
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time had elapsed. In addition, if the innovator registered his novel
industrial compilation in due course, the wholesale cloner would also
have to pay the standard, automatic license (or user's) fees for a fur-
ther relatively short period thereafter, for example, another three or
four years after the initial blocking period had elapsed.'49
This same set of default rules, however, would provide more
favorable treatment to second comers who entered the same market
segment with a substantially different (and probably improved) pro-
gram that nonetheless borrowed a significant amount of functional
components (i.e., industrial subcompilations) from the originator's
registered industrial compilation. In this case, the second comer's
willingness to defray the costs of producing a significantly different
program, when viewed as a whole, should exempt him or her from the
obligation to delay entry into the market under the blocking period
lodged against wholesale cloners. Nevertheless, the second comer
must pay reasonable royalties for the reuse of any borrowed subcom-
pilations of applied know-how under the standard, automatic licensing
provisions established by the relevant technical community for the
prescribed period of time, say, three or four years.' 50
For example, if IBM's new "ThinkPad" program were registered
under these rules, non-cloning competitors who rushed to reimple-
ment its major functional improvements into their own programs
would not suffer any significant delay in entering the same market
segment beyond the time required to produce their own upgraded
products. This is exactly what occurs under the copyright law as cur-
rently enforced, which provides no protection for ideas or functional
matter as such.' 5' Under the proposed liability regime, however,
these second comers-though violating neither the patent nor the
copyright laws-would all contribute to IBM's costs of research and
development, at least in proportion to the ratio between the value of
149. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2412-26. Because the relevant
technical communities tend to consist mostly of firms that will be both innovators and
borrowers at different times, it becomes feasible to devise a set of default rules regulating
users' rights and liabilities with respect to the reuse of subpatentable noncopyrightable
innovations that would aim to put both innovators and borrowers in a win-win position.
Automatic licensing provisions along these lines could then ensure that innovators obtain
reasonable contributions to the cost of research and development from borrowers who
applied their innovations to socially productive uses, and that borrowers would have a
constantly expanding flow of adequately funded innovation from which to borrow, without
undermining the long-term public interest in free competition. See Legal Hybrids, supra
note 13, at 2535-39, 2544-45 ("The Industrial Compilation"), 2545-48 ("Artificial Lead
Time"), 2548-51 ("A Menu of Users' Liabilities").
150. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2412-20.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994); supra notes 100-103 and accompany-
ing text.
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the amount borrowed from IBM and the overall value of their own
products as a whole.152
A legal framework to implement these proposals would provide
"all prospective borrowers with a set of legal and business options that
will necessarily enter into their own cost-benefit analyses .... [T]he
position of single borrowers will then vary with the status of their own
research and development at the times they must select from the
menu of other permissible legal and business strategies."'15 3 Over
time, the collection agency charged with administering these auto-
matic licenses would find itself managing electronic repositories of ap-
plied know-how that were constantly entering and leaving the liability
system.154 The resulting royalties should benefit the relevant technical
community as a whole by ensuring that innovators, whose achieve-
ments ultimately prove their mettle in the marketplace, receive a ris-
ing flow of contributions to the continuing costs of research and
development from all those who exploit these same achievements. At
the same time, borrowers know they will have more and better inno-
vation to borrow than would be the case if free-riding appropriators
threaten market failure. 55 Above all, this resort to liability rules
152. Something like this already occurs with respect to novel engineering projects de-
posited under an apposite sui generis regime related to the Italian copyright law, and it
constitutes the one operative example of a default liability regime that bears some resem-
blance to the model under review. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2477-78 (discussing
Italian Copyright law, law no. 633 of April 22, 1941, as amended through July 29, 1989, art.
99, and citing authorities); see also Gustaro Ghidini, Prospettive "protezioniste" nel diritto
industriale, 64 RIVISTA Di DIRrrro INDUSTRIALE 77-80 (1995) (endorsing this approach to
new technologies, including software). However, the Italian regime protecting novel tech-
nical drawings and engineering projects lasts too long-twenty years-and provides only
an automatic license for reuse, but no artificial lead-time period like that discussed in the
text.
153. Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2540-41. For example, under the hypothetical set
of facts discussed in the text, the model provides a second comer who was prepared to
make substantial improvements with at least the following options: "1) enter the market
quickly with his own product and its autonomously developed improvements; 2) enter
quickly with his own product and with improved components borrowed from other innova-
tors at scheduled rates; 3) enter quickly with his own product and with improved compo-
nents licensed from other innovators; 4) delay entry beyond the specified period of liability
and borrow unpatented, noncopyrightable components at will and without payment." Id.
at 2541-42. For other options under other scenarios, see generally id. at 2539-44 ("The Fair
Follower's Menu of Pro-Competitive Legal Options"). In all cases, "the fair followers'
cost-benefit analysis must take into account the differentiated liabilities, if any, attaching to
different strategies of use under the standard default regime, in addition to his own autono-
mous costs of research and development." Id. at 2542.
154. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2427-29 ("Electronic Reposito-
ries Can Become Software Exchanges"); Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2555-57 ("Collec-
tive Action").
155. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 13, at 2533-39 ("Off-the-Rack Liability Rules Allo-
cating Contributions to the Cost of Research & Development").
1995]
avoids the top-down market distortions characteristic of exclusive
property rights by allowing single firms to choose from a menu of in-
herently pro-competitive options in the light of their own business
needs and strategies. 156
A more detailed discussion of these proposals exceeds the scope
of this paper. Nevertheless, the authors of both the Manifesto and the
Legal Hybrids monographs believe this extended framework has suffi-
cient generality to serve as the basis for a new paradigm of intellectual
property law. The Manifesto provides a number of working models
for implementing such a framework with respect to computer pro-
grams. 157 Similar models could cut through the legal thickets that cur-
rently surround proposals to protect industrial designs, electronic
databases, products of biogenetic processes, and other products of ap-
plied know-how.
Once such regimes prove their worth in actual practice, a general
purpose know-how law, built on modified liability principles, becomes
a feasible alternative to the proliferation of hybrid regimes of exclu-
sive property rights that are currently undermining the competitive
ethos from within.1 58 A general purpose know-how law along these
lines could then be embedded in either Article lObis of the Paris Con-
vention, or in a separate section of a revised TRIPS Agreement.
Something like this already occurred with respect to semiconductor
chip designs (which entered international industrial property law in
fewer than ten years) 159 and to the provision concerning the protec-
tion of undisclosed information (which represents a case of instant in-
ternational law).1 60 Until then, one may safely predict that the
"know-how gap in TRIPS" will continue to limit the relevancy of this
Agreement for twenty-first century economic development.
156. See id. at 2539-44; supra text accompanying note 153.
157. See generally Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 13, at 2413-29.
158. See Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade, supra
note 14, at 83-98; Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, supra note 14, at 94-98.
159. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 35-38; Universal Minimum Standards,
supra note 8, at 373-75.
160. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39; supra notes 119-126 and accompany-
ing text.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:763
